This paper presents a new-Keynesian DSGE model to study optimal policy responses to a temporary rise in energy prices, a situation like that caused by the war in Ukraine. The objective is to avoid the emergence of a wage price spiral, in the presence of the kind of real-wage resistance which has been shown to be empirically important, and yet to avoid large increases in interest rates. We argue that this outcome can be achieved by means of a very large cut in consumption taxes (or a very large subsidy to energy supply). That action would moderate (or in the limit completely remove) the energy-price-induced cost-push pressures, thereby meaning that interest rates would need to be raised very little (and in the limit not at all). Such tax cuts would greatly increase the government budget deficit. It is therefore important to prevent such a policy strategy from creating excess demand in the short run, or Ponzi-game-like fiscal outcomes in the long run. We present simulation results using our New Keynesian DSGE model to show that these fiscal constraints can be satisfied but that, nevertheless, inflationary pressures can be fully disciplined without large increases in interest rates. We argue that, especially in time of war, such a policy strategy may be desirable.